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A Different Tale of Judicial Power: Administrative Review as a 
Problematic Response to the Judicialisation of Tribunals 
 
 
Administrative review involves the reconsideration of an administrative decision by a different official 
within the same public body. Administrative review has operated in various contexts for years, but the 
rate of its recent expansion has been remarkable. Two systems have been key to this rapid growth. 
The introduction of ‘mandatory reconsideration’ in social security decision-making requires that 
benefit claimants must first seek administrative review before appealing to a tribunal. In immigration, 
long-established appeal rights have been replaced entirely by administrative review. The volume of 
disputes channelled through administrative review far exceeds that of tribunals and makes judicial 
review appear esoteric. This is a radical change to how people access and experience justice in the 
public law context. For the last fifty years and more, individuals in receipt of a negative administrative 
decision could appeal directly to independent and judicial tribunals to determine their legal rights and 
entitlements to social security benefits and immigration status. The rationale for this fundamental 
shift is clear: the increase in tribunal caseloads, austerity, and political factors (the desire to reduce 
social security spending and immigration rates) have prompted the Government to reduce the number 
the cases proceeding to tribunals by greater use of administrative review. Within the longer arc of 
administrative justice developments, we suggest that administrative review can be conceived as a 
consequence of the government’s own progressive judicialisation of tribunals—and the related 
increases in both cost and time. Government departments have argued that administrative review can 
provide people with an efficient and quicker way of correcting case-working errors and thereby 
reducing unnecessary appeals. On the other hand, there are concerns about the effectiveness of 
administrative review as a redress mechanism and whether it weakens the ability of people to 
challenge decisions. 
This article argues that administrative review – as it currently operates - is a problematic 
response to the judicialisation of tribunals in recent decades. The overall effect of the operation of 
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administrative review has been to weaken the ability of people to secure redress against 
administrative decisions. The first part discusses the need for justice within administrative decision-
making and the development of tribunals. The second part turns to the recent expansion of 
administrative review. The third part considers the practical operation of administrative review in both 
the social security and immigration contexts. In the fourth part, we assess administrative review and 
suggest ways of enhancing its effectiveness. We conclude by considering the wider constitutional 
implications of this development of administrative review. In particular, we suggest this episode of 
de-judicialisation provides insight into nature of judicial power in the UK public law system. In contrast 
to the standard, high-profile debate about the growth of judicial power and the rise of “juristocracy”, 
the recent experience of administrative review tells a different tale. The greater use of administrative 
review has gone hand-in-hand with a correspondingly smaller role for the judicial control of 
government. 
 
Administrative decision-making and the judicialisation of tribunals 
The basic need for administrative justice begins with primary administrative decision-making and its 
impact upon people. Justice within initial-decision is the most important form of justice in terms of 
volume. All decision-making starts – and most of it finishes – here. Government departments, such as 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and the Home Office make millions of individualised 
decisions each year to determine people’s entitlements and to implement policy. Such bodies are 
variants of a particular organisational model: the machine bureaucracy. That is, a large heavily-staffed 
organisation that undertakes a vast number of repetitive operating tasks through routinized and 
formalised procedures.1 The basic legitimating value of this model is the ability to process a massive 
volume of decisions efficiently and accurately. Given their technical superiority, administrative 
                                                          
1 H. Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp.314-347. Cf. 
Mashaw’s model of ‘bureaucratic rationality’: J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Manging Social Security Disability 
Claims (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 25-26. 
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bureaucracies are often the only viable means of managing large-scale social issues and for 
implementing democratically-mandated policy goals.2 
The ideal model of machine bureaucracy assumes the rational, accurate and efficient 
implementation of policy. In practice, administrative bureaucracies are often afflicted by dysfunctional 
behaviour, which constrains their capacity to make robust decisions. Government agencies are subject 
to intense political pressures, overwhelmed with individualised decision-making, and are 
administratively unstable. These dysfunctional aspects often have tragic consequences for those who 
interact with government. Caseworkers have to make complex, sensitive, and morally-demanding 
decisions that are often life-changing for the individuals involved.3 For instance, is a benefit claimant 
unable to work for health or disability reasons? Is a foreign national entitled to leave to enter to join 
a family member already present in the UK? Yet, government bodies frequently operate in an 
impersonal, bureaucratic, and rule-bound manner. The often ‘byzantine complexity’ of administrative 
rules reflects a hyper-legalism in which their frequent misapplication is inevitable.4 Weighed down by 
the both the volume of decisions they have to make and processing targets, caseworkers often apply 
the rules not as a means to an end but as an end in themselves. The mechanical application of the 
rules to a wide variety of citizens and circumstances can result in arbitrary, insensitive, and incorrect 
decisions. Mistakes and errors may arise either because of unintentional carelessness, oversights, and 
communication issues or from ill-intentioned bias. 
The variable or poor quality of administrative decisions and their implications for claimants is 
a long-standing theme of administrative justice.5 Representatives and advocacy groups have 
frequently criticised the poor quality of government decisions. Recent tribunal decisions illustrate the 
                                                          
2 Government does not have a monopoly of decision-making. Over recent years, government has increasingly 
outsourced functions to private providers to reduce costs. For instance, health care professional reports used in 
benefit decision-making are produced by private providers. 
3 B. Zacka, When the State Meets Street (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2017). 
4 Pokhriyal v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1568, [4] (Jackson LJ), on the 
complexity of the Immigration Rules. 
5 N. Wikeley, ‘Future Directions for Tribunals: A United Kingdom Perspective’ in R. Creyke (ed.), Tribunals in the 
Common Law World (Sydney: Federation Press, 2008), pp.175-184; Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, 
Right First Time (2011). 
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mix of intense concern and bafflement at chaotic procedures and poor decisions: ‘[e]very working day, 
the First-tier Tribunal overturns decisions of the Secretary of State because the decision maker has 
omitted to consider all the relevant issues;6 ‘[y]et another case in which the removal of an award of 
the Personal Independence Payment was not dealt with in any sense adequately’;7 ‘yet another case 
in which the putative appellant and the First-tier Tribunal was misled by HM Revenue & Customs and 
its defective procedures … A combination of Kafka and Captain Mainwaring might be thought unlikely 
to come up with such a sorry state of affairs.’8 Similarly, immigration decision letters frequently ‘do 
not sufficiently rely on the law and guidance’ relevant to the decision.9 Clearly administrative 
performance varies, but at its worst poor service includes inflexible attitudes, incomprehensible 
decision letters, aggressive enforcement, and downright incompetence. The need for effective control 
of machine bureaucracies, and redress for those subject to their decisions, is clear. 
 For the last century and more, the principal remedy for challenging routine administrative 
decisions has been to allow affected individuals to appeal to tribunals. The overarching ethos of 
tribunals has long been swift, inexpensive, and uncomplicated access to justice. The task of tribunals 
is to undertake a full examination of the merits of a claim, whether for benefits or an immigration 
status. Unlike when courts conduct judicial review, tribunals exercise a fact-finding function and can 
substitute their own decisions. An equally important feature of tribunals is their emphasis upon 
adjudication not just as a procedure, but their cultural insistence on an impartial and judicial state of 
mind, consistency, and the careful collection and analysis of evidence.10 Given the impact of decisions 
                                                          
6 RR v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (JSA) [2017] UKUT 50 (AAC), [39]. 
7 PM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2017] UKUT 37 (AAC), [1]. 
8 DG v HMRC and EG (TC) [2016] UKUT 505 (AAC), [1]-[2]. See also JW v HMRC (TC) [2015] UKUT 359 (AAC), [1]: 
‘yet another case that falls into the litany of cases in which the dreadful quality of HMRC’s appeal response to 
the First-tier Tribunal is a central issue’. 
9 House of Lords Constitution Committee, The Legislative Process, 16 November 2016, Oral evidence of Sir Ernest 
Ryder (Senior President of Tribunals), Q 44. 
10 W.A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 3rd edn., 1951), pp.360-418; J. Jowell, 
‘The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion’ [1973] P.L. 178, 194-200. For the perspective of a tribunal judge, 
see N. Warren, ‘The Adjudication Gap’ (2006) 13 J.S.S.L. 110. 
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upon people, the exercise of sound judgement is at the heart of adjudication. Another crucial feature 
is the ability of affected persons to participate directly in the decision process.11 
 Tribunals naturally appeal to a different set of values than bureaucratic administration: 
judicial independence; fair procedures; and better-reasoned decisions. Furthermore, administrative 
decision-making processes operate in the context of an unequal relationship between claimants and 
government. ‘One-shotter’ claimants go up directly against ‘repeat-player’ public bodies which 
operate large, monolithic, and monopolistic processes.12 The latter benefit not just from experience 
of the system, but also influence its design.13 Given this fundamental inequality, tribunals provide a 
counterweight to the routinised, rigid, and impersonal processing of decisions. In hearings, tribunals 
meet claimants face-to-face and use their expertise and inquisitorial procedures to draw out evidence 
from claimants in order to exercise complex judgment. Just as importantly, given that their vulnerable 
clientele are often intimidated by the prospect of legal procedures, tribunals try to cultivate an 
atmosphere in which claimants could feel confident about explaining personal aspects of their lives. 
It is important to note that tribunals do not themselves dispense uniformly high standards of justice: 
tribunals are far from perfect. There have been instances of glaring failures by tribunals to act fairly 
and in accordance with legal principles. Some have a tendency to be highly adversarial and some 
tribunals hearings are significantly delayed. Moreover, in recent year the courts have been questioning 
the fairness of some appeals procedures, such as out of country appeals in the immigration context.14 
Nonetheless, generally speaking, adjudication by higher qualified tribunal judges results in a higher 
standard of decision-making compared with that of pressurised front-line, often junior caseworkers. 
                                                          
11 Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement Act 2007, s 2(3) and the overriding objective in tribunal procedure rules, 
e.g., The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules (SI 2008/2685), r 2. 
12 M. Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law & 
Society Review 95. 
13 V. Bondy and A. Le Sueur, Designing Redress: A Study About Grievances Against Public Bodies (2012). 
14 R (Kyarie and Byndloss) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 2380. 
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The development of tribunals both individually and collectively is not easily summarised, but 
a prominent and sustained theme has been judicialisation.15 This trend has had various features: 
increasingly complex substantive rules; the appointment of legally qualified personnel as tribunal 
judges; greater use of representatives; orderly procedures; reasoned decisions; and onward appeals.16 
This trend culminated in the creation of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals. Designated as a superior 
court of record, the Upper Tribunal is recognised as a specialist and expert body.17 The gradual 
judicialisation of the tribunals system in recent decades has been largely led and approved by 
successive governments. It is also important to note that judicialisation was not an unmitigated 
good—indeed it is a ‘profoundly ambiguous device’.18 Making tribunals more like courts can 
undermine their distinctive role. Legalistic procedures can limit the degree to which claimants can 
participate in proceedings. Complex legal rules and Upper Tribunal precedents are often 
impenetrable. Nonetheless, judicialised procedures have, on the whole, provided advantages for 
claimants in terms of fair process and legal accuracy.19 
Despite being a creature largely of its own creation, judicialisation raises a different set of 
concerns for the government—namely cost, delay, and the frustration of ultimate political objectives. 
Since the Franks Report of 1957, the speed and cheapness of tribunals have been their principal 
attractions for government.20 Even before the financial crisis of 2007/08, the Government framed the 
discussion of tribunals, and administrative justice more broadly, around the concept of ‘proportionate 
                                                          
15 G. Drewry, ‘The Judicialisation of “Administrative” Tribunals in the UK: From Hewart to Leggatt’ (2008) 28 
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences 45; R. Thomas, ‘Current Developments in UK Tribunals: 
Challenges for Administrative Justice’ in S. Nason (ed.), Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative 
Perspectives (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2017). 
16 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edn., 2009), 
p.490. 
17 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, s 3(5); R. (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2012] 1 AC 663 [40]; AH 
(Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 1 AC 678; Jones v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] 2 AC 48; R. Carnwath, ‘Tribunal Justice—A New Start’ [2009] P.L. 48. 
18 T. Prosser, ‘Poverty, Ideology, and Legality: Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals and Their Predecessors’ 
(1977) 4 British Journal of Law and Society 39, 58. 
19 There is a much wider debate here. See N. Wikeley, ‘Burying Bell: Managing the Judicialisation of Social 
Security Tribunals’ (2000) 63 M.L.R. 475. 
20 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (Cmnd 218,1957) (the Franks report). 
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dispute resolution’.21 In practice, tribunal procedures, with their (current) heavy reliance on paper 
documents and hearings, are complex, drawn-out, and inefficient.22 However, as part of its austerity 
policies, government has imposed large-scale reductions in funding in the justice system. Much of the 
current crisis in access to justice stems in large part from legal aid restrictions.23 Previously, legal aid 
had been available for advice (in social security tribunals) or advice and representation (immigration 
tribunals), but it is now largely unavailable24 prompting the familiar problem of how litigants in person 
can be expected to navigate and participate in a legal process.25 Yet, the Coalition Government (2010-
15) and the subsequent Conservative governments have focused on reducing public spending and 
have viewed tribunals as both overloaded and costly. Appeal fees have been introduced across a range 
of tribunals, though some have been found to be unlawful and some planned fee increases have been 
abandoned.26 These restrictions, combined with the abolition of the Administrative Justice and 
Tribunals Council, have weakened the quality of administrative justice.27 The main response of the 
Ministry of Justice to such concerns has been to announce a programme of court and tribunal reform 
that will introduce digital and online dispute resolution methods into tribunals.28 In the meantime, 
government departments have expanded the use of administrative review. 
                                                          
21 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals (Cm 
6243, 2004); M. Adler, ‘Tribunal Reform: Proportionate Dispute Resolution and the Pursuit of Administrative 
Justice’ (2006) 69 M.L.R. 958. 
22 HM Courts and Tribunals Service is currently implementing a digitisation reform programme under which 
tribunal cases would largely be conducted online. See Ministry of Justice, Transforming Our Justice System 
(2016). 
23 E. Palmer, T. Cornford, A. Guinchard, and Y. Marique (eds.), Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics 
of Austerity (Oxford: Hart, 2016). 
24 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. In the immigration context, legal aid remains 
available only for asylum and bail cases. 
25 The Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person: Report (2013); H. Genn, ‘Do-it-yourself Law: Access to 
Justice and the Challenge of Self-representation’ (2013) 32 C.J.Q. 411; JUSTICE, Delivering Justice in an Age of 
Austerity (2015). 
26 Ministry of Justice, Court and Tribunal Fees (Cm 9124, 2015); House of Commons Justice Committee, Courts 
and Tribunals Fees (HC 167 2016-17); R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] 3 WLR 409. 
27 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, Securing Fairness and Redress: Administrative Justice at Risk? 
(2011); M. Adler, ‘The Rise and Fall of Administrative Justice – A Cautionary Tale’ (2012) 8 Socio-Legal Review 
28; N. O’Brien, ‘Administrative Justice: A Libertarian Cinderella in Search of an Egalitarian Prince’ (2012) 83 
Political Quarterly 494. A new privately-backed Administrative Justice Council has now been set up between 
HMCTS and JUSTICE, a non-governmental organisation. 
28 Ministry of Justice, Transforming Our Justice System (2016) 15. For discussion on the progress of these reforms 





Illustrating the fragmented administrative justice landscape, administrative review schemes have 
developed on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, from one perspective, ‘administrative review’ is a catch-all 
phrase to cover a wide miscellany of systems. In the context of the Social Fund (abolished in 2013), 
there operated a distinctive scheme under which initial decisions were reviewed by a functionally 
separate body, the Independent Review Service. Despite its controversial origins, this scheme 
developed a strong reputation for providing an independent, expert, timely, and high quality service.29 
Since 2009, tax decisions can been challenged either by way of administrative review or tribunal 
appeal.30 In 2011, school exclusion appeals were downgraded to review panels.31 Administrative 
review also operated at the preliminary pre-protocol stages of judicial review litigation in which many 
claims are settled out of court.32 Tables 1 and 2 provide detail on social security and immigration 
reviews and appeals. 
 
                                                          
discussion on tribunals reform in particular, see: R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson, The Digitalisation of Tribunals: 
What we know and what we need to know (Public Law Project and UK Administrative Justice Institute, 2018). 
29 Social Fund Commissioner, Annual Report 2012/2013 (2013). 
30 The Transfer of Tribunal Functions and Revenue and Customs Appeals Order (SI 2009/56). 
31 Education Act 2011, s 4. 
32 V. Bondy and M. Sunkin, ‘Settlement in Judicial Review Proceedings’ [2009] PL 237. 
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Table 1: Administrative review schemes 
 Social Security Immigration 
Basic design Administrative review 
is mandatory before 
proceeding to a 
tribunal 
Administrative 
review has replaced 
most appeal rights 




Legal basis Secondary legislation Immigration Rules 
and administrative 
guidance 
Time limit for 
requesting 
review 
30 days, with scope 
to extend for good 
reason; can appeal to 
a tribunal if request 
to extend is refused33 
28 days for overseas 
decisions; 14 days 
for decisions taken 















to explain decisions 







can be submitted 
Additional evidence 
cannot be submitted 






No formal deadline; 
straightforward cases 
expected to be 
completed within 14 
days 
No formal deadline; 
service standard of 




Tribunal appeal on 








Inspector of Borders 
and Immigration 







                                                          
33 The route to appeal was established by an Upper Tribunal ruling and not the DWP itself: R(CJ) and SG v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] UKUT 324 (AAC). 
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Table 2: Comparison of social security and immigration administrative reviews and tribunal 
appeals, 2015-1634 









































£707 15 days 230 days 18 per cent 49 per cent 
 
The intention is that, by filtering our clearly wrong decisions, administrative review will reduce 
unnecessary tribunal appeals and the associated costs and delays. Furthermore, it is argued that 
administrative review will provide a more efficient and user-friendly redress mechanism than that 
offered by increasingly legalistic tribunals, especially in areas of mass administration. There are also 
arguments for administrative review from the perspective of claimants. Research into user 
experiences of administrative justice systems has found that people attach great importance to the 
timely resolution of disputes.36 Vulnerable people who may dispute benefit decisions likely have an 
acute social need. A legal model that situates claimants and public authorities as adversaries is unlikely 
to assist those with urgent social needs By contrast, a swift review by the public body has considerable 
advantages in terms of ease and efficiency and providing a better way to resolves informally without 
the anxiety of a hearing. For instance, a student visa appeal may take months to be heard—and 
                                                          
34 Ministry of Justice, Tribunals Statistics Quarterly (2017); DWP, Employment and Support Allowance: Work 
Capability Assessments, Mandatory Reconsiderations and Appeals (2017); DWP, Personal Independence 
Payments: Official Statistics (2017); FOI 106180; FOI 106568; FOI 40166. 
35 The Home Office does not collect data on administrative reviews submitted by claimants overseas and those 
in immigration detention. 
36 A. Bryson and R. Berthoud, ‘Social Security Appeals: What Do the Claimants Want?’ (1997) 4 J.S.S.L. 17; G. 
Richardson and H. Genn, ‘Tribunals in Transition’ [2007] P.L. 116, 123. 
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conclude long after the start of the academic year—whereas an administrative review can take 15 
days. 
The lower costs of administrative review arise from procedural differences. In tribunals, 
appellants attend hearings before a legally qualified tribunal judge and, in some appeals, a non-legal 
member (or members). By discarding costly and lengthy judicial procedures, administrative review can 
handle a large caseload more quickly and efficiently. Tribunal judges specialise in particular areas of 
administrative law whereas non-legal members bring other specialist skills, such as medical 
knowledge. Tribunals draw out evidence actively, through either inquisitorial or ‘enabling’ procedures 
for unrepresented appellants or more adversarial hearings with represented claimants.37 They also 
issue detailed reasons and decisions that can be appealed to the Upper Tribunal. By contrast, 
administrative review is a predominantly paper-based process typically undertaken by relatively junior 
officials. The reviewer will typically consider only the evidence previously submitted. In some contexts, 
such as social security, reviewers may contact claimants over the telephone to explain the initial 
decision and collect further information. Another difference is that appeals involve a complete 
assessment whereas administrative review is typically limited to correcting case working errors.38 
Beneath these formal differences lie differing cultural orientations and presuppositions between 
independent tribunal judges and reviewers located firmly within the administration. 
                                                          
37 According to an Upper Tribunal judge, the enabling role of social security tribunals has been described as their 
‘unique selling point’: S. Wright, ‘The Impact of Austerity and Structural Reforms on the Accessibility of Tribunal 
Justice’ in Palmer et al, no 24 above. By contrast, immigration tribunals are more adversarial. See generally R. 
Thomas, ‘From “Adversarial v Inquisitorial” to “Active, Enabling, and Investigative”: Developments in UK 
Tribunals’ in L. Jacobs and S. Baglay (eds), The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative Regimes: Global 
Perspectives (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), p.51. 
38 There is no coherent approach as to the scope and grounds of administrative review. Immigration reviews are 
concerned with ‘case working error’ (Immigration Rules, AR2.1). Homelessness reviews focus on a ‘deficiency or 
irregularity in the original decision’ (The Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Review Procedures) 
Regulations (SI 1999/71), r 8(2)). Social security mandatory reconsiderations focus on ‘official error’ and ‘mistake 
of fact’ (The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and 
Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations (SI 2013/381), r 9)). As regards tax reviews, ‘The nature 
and extent of the review are to be such as appear appropriate to HMRC in the circumstances’ (Taxes 
Management Act 1970, s 49E(2) as inserted by the Transfer of Tribunal Functions and Revenue and Customs 
Appeals Order (SI 2009/56)). 
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The debate over whether the expansion of administrative review is positive or not has largely 
fallen into two camps: traditional scepticism and a more sanguine view. In 1989, the Council on 
Tribunals stated that where an administrative decision affects a citizen's liberty, livelihood, status or 
basic rights, then nothing less than an appeal to a properly equipped judicial and independent 
adjudicative body would suffice.39 On this view, any attempt to compromise the status of appeals in 
whole or in part on resource grounds would be wrong in principle. Furthermore, given its lack of 
institutional independence, administrative review could not ‘in any sense be regarded as a proper 
substitute for a right of appeal’.40 By contrast, the 2001 Leggatt review of tribunals argued for the 
systematic use of administrative review to ensure that only the right cases would be taken to tribunals. 
Administrative review could be used to avoid the costs and stress of appeals and enable senior and 
experienced officers to identify problems in the system.41 According to Leggatt, administrative review 
would be a ‘valuable way of improving service to the public’—if public bodies looked at their own 
decisions critically and adopted the ‘kind of independent-mindedness and impartiality which can be 
expected from tribunals’.42 The critical question is then not one of principle but of effectiveness. In 
order to assess the recent growth of administrative review, it is necessary to consider the practical 
operation of administrative review in areas such as social security and immigration. It is this to which 
we now turn. 
 
Administrative review in operation 
 
Social security mandatory reconsiderations 
                                                          
39 Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 1989/90 (1990), [1.14]. 
40 Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 1989/90 (1990), [1.9]. See also R. Sainsbury, ‘Internal Reviews and the 
Weakening of Social Security Claimants’ Rights of Appeal’ in G. Richardson and H. Genn (eds), Administrative 
Law & Government Action (Oxford University Press, 1994). 
41 The Leggatt Report, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service (2001), [9.6]. 
42 Ibid., [9.6] and [9.8]. 
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The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) makes some 12 million benefit decisions per year. 
Initial claims for benefits are lodged and then decided by officials. For the two principal benefits, 
Employment and Support Allowance and Personal Independence Payments, a health care assessment 
will often be undertaken by a ‘healthcare professional’ employed by a contracted-out provider. 
Refused claims can be appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) comprised of 
a tribunal judge and non-legal members.43 In addition to appeals, the DWP has long had the power to 
review its own decisions.44 In this way, administrative review is a fundamental feature of the system 
given that decision-making is often based on factors – such as an individual’s circumstances, including 
their health and income – that can change. 
In 2013 the DWP introduced mandatory reconsideration with the aim of resolving disputes as 
early as possible and reducing unnecessary demand on tribunals. This major process change made 
administrative review a distinct and mandatory stage before claimants could proceed to a tribunal. 
The former position was that claimants seeking to challenge initial refusal decisions could appeal 
straightaway to the tribunal. On receipt of an appeal, the DWP would routinely review its decision. If 
the decision was reviewed in the claimant’s favour, then the appeal would lapse; if not, the appeal 
would proceed to the tribunal. However, with mandatory reconsideration, the review stage is a 
separate and compulsory stage in the dispute process. Claimants can now only appeal if they first 
request the department to reconsider its initial decision and then, second, lodge an appeal with the 
tribunal.45 In short, a one-step process has become a two-stage process. Such changes have taken 
place against a background of austerity and welfare reform to reduce benefit spending through 
stringent rules and policies, such as benefit sanctions.46 A controversial feature has been the 
                                                          
43 The First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) has 1,700 judges and non-legal members. 
44 Social Security Act 1998, ss 9 and 10. 
45 Welfare Reform Act 2012, s 102; The Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s 
Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations (SI 2013/381). A 
concurrent change was that whereas previously claimants lodged their appeals with the DWP, appeals are now 
lodged directly with the tribunal. 
46 For an overview, see N. Timmins, ‘The Coalition and Society (IV): Welfare’ in A. Seldon and M. Finn (eds), The 
Coalition Effect, 2010-2015 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); C. Beatty and S. Fothergill, ‘Welfare 
Reform in the United Kingdom 2010–16: Expectations, Outcomes, and Local Impacts’ (2017) Social Policy and 
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outsourcing of health assessments to private companies, such as ATOS and Maximus. Such providers 
have been subject to criticism concerning the quality of assessments and the resulting high appeal 
success rates. 
Between 2013 and 2017, some 300 officials (mostly at Executive Officer grade) have 
undertaken some 1.5 million mandatory reconsiderations. The principal advantage of the process is 
timeliness. Since 2014, the average monthly clearance time for mandatory reconsiderations has not 
exceeded 20 days.47 This compares with an average timeliness of appeals of 20 weeks.48 Given that 
benefits claimants have a significant interest in timely decisions on their entitlements, the shorter 
time taken by mandatory reconsideration is a considerable advantage. At the same time, there are 
various concerns with other aspects of the process. 
A major concern is that the two-stage nature of the process—mandatory reconsideration then 
appeal–has arguably weakened access to justice by deterring claimants with strong cases from 
proceeding to tribunals. As Figure 1 demonstrates, there has been a dramatic decline in the number 
of appeals lodged following the introduction of mandatory reconsideration. In 2014/15, appeal 
receipts were 73 percent lower compared with 2013/14.49 There have been other contributory factors 
in play here too, such as the early cancellation in 2014 of the contract with ATOS to undertake health 
assessments and a consequent slowdown in initial decisions.50 According to the DWP, the reduction 
in the volume of appeals is evidence that mandatory reconsideration was successful in its aim of 
resolving more disputes without the need for appeal.51 
 
                                                          
Administration (online pre-publication). On sanctions, see M. Adler, ‘A New Leviathan: Benefit Sanctions in the 
Twenty-first Century’ (2016) 43 Journal of Law and Society 195. 
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[Figure 1 here] 
 
To some extent, a reduction in appeals was to be expected if the new system was working 
well. Mandatory reconsideration was justified in part as a filtering mechanism to reduce unnecessary 
appeals. Such filtering, common in other redress mechanisms such as judicial review and ombudsmen, 
is necessary to manage caseloads. Yet, with mandatory reconsideration, the filtering is being 
undertaken by the same government department whose initial decisions are being challenged, 
prompting concerns that government may have a self-interest in discouraging claimants from pursuing 
their cases further.52 Furthermore, claimant fatigue often discourages people from challenging 
decisions and this is likely to be a major factor here. Vulnerable individuals—such as those with a long-
term disability or mental illness—often lack the ability and confidence to pursue a challenge to a 
welfare bureaucracy, especially when their claim has already been rejected twice.53 The change with 
mandatory reconsideration is that an individual must twice decide to challenge in order to appeal. 
According to Judge Robert Martin, the former Tribunal Chamber President, mandatory 
reconsideration ‘is of dubious advantage’: 
 
It builds in an extra step, in that the claimant now has to make two applications: mandatory 
reconsideration and then appeal. It is bound to take longer. Personally, I am quite concerned that a 
number of claimants who may have winnable cases drop out between the mandatory reconsideration 
stage and deciding to make a further appeal. It seems to me to be regressive. The only value would be 
if mandatory reconsideration … resulted in a much more rigorous reappraisal by the Department of its 
decisions than under the old scheme.54 
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There is also the related impact of taking social security out of scope for legal aid and reductions in 
advice services.55 The Upper Tribunal has expressed scepticism as to whether mandatory 
reconsideration has any real advantages in reducing unnecessary appeals that have merit; under the 
previous system, the department would treat an appeal as a request for a revision and review the 
decision before it reached the tribunal.56 Determined claimants can still appeal. Nonetheless, the need 
to make two applications to access the tribunal rather than the previous single application may well 
discourage vulnerable claimants with winnable cases from appealing because they find the process 
too onerous. As the Supreme Court recognised in Unison, impediments to access to justice can 
constitute a serious hindrance even if they do not make access completely impossible.57 
 Such access to justice concerns have arisen in part because of the effect of mandatory 
reconsideration upon the behaviour of a vulnerable group of claimants. They have also arisen by the 
DWP adopting the position that applications for mandatory reconsideration made out time did not 
generate a right of appeal to the tribunal. Instead, the Department contended, the appropriate 
remedy was to seek judicial review of the DWP’s decision not to allow a mandatory reconsideration 
out of time. However, in R (CJ) and SG v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions the Upper Tribunal 
ruled against the DWP holding that there was a high risk that vulnerable claimants with good claims 
could miss the time limits, a risk exacerbated by the reduction in advice services. According to the 
Upper Tribunal, the consequence of the Department’s approach was that it had improperly assumed 
the role of gatekeeper to the tribunal system. To deny the right of appeal to claimants who made out 
of time applications for reconsideration would remove the right of appeal and result in a significant 
number of claimants entitled to benefits not receiving them.58 
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 What then of the quality of reconsideration decision-making? Shortcomings had been 
identified in the pre-2013 reconsideration system by the then President of Appeal Tribunals. There 
was little consistent evidence that the DWP had been effectively reconsidering decisions before they 
came to the tribunal; ‘often the appeal papers show an unwillingness on the part of the decision-
maker to reconsider the decision in the absence of the appellant supplying fresh medical or other third 
party evidence’.59 With mandatory reconsideration, the Department stated that it would ensure its 
decisions would go through a ‘robust reconsideration’ by which decisions would be checked 
thoroughly and be accompanied by detailed reasons.60 Nevertheless, the quality of reconsideration 
decisions has been criticised.61 Tribunal Judges have expressed scepticism about the thoroughness of 
mandatory reconsideration and view the process as an additional administrative barrier for claimants 
who wish to challenge their decision rather than a substantive re-examination of the evidence.62 
Advisers have stated that decision notices often repeat initial refusal reasons without providing any 
further elaboration. There is also a widely held perception that the ‘chances of a claimant actually 
having their decision revised at mandatory reconsideration stage are almost negligible to the point 
where most advisers and claimants view mandatory reconsideration as a formality and expect a 
negative decision.’63 
As regards claimants, of all the transactions claimants have with DWP, mandatory 
reconsideration has the lowest satisfaction rating.64 Claimants have felt that new evidence submitted 
for a reconsideration is often ignored and that the process is more of a ‘rubber stamp’ than a thorough 
audit of the original decision.65 This in turn prompts some claimants to lodge appeals against poor 
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decisions that could have been properly resolved earlier. For instance, it is common for claimants to 
be awarded no entitlement points initially, to submit additional information at the reconsideration, 
which then confirms the initial decision, for the tribunal to then award maximum points.66 There are 
also concerns that reviewers routinely accept health care reports from the DWP’s contracted-out 
supplier, the quality of which has been criticised,67 and disregard other evidence such as a medical 
report by a General Practitioner, the quality of such reports has been subject to sustained criticism. 
Tribunal judges have noted that they regularly see decision letters and health assessment reports at 
appeal hearings that have used standard or repetitive language for different functions, which in turn 
undermines confidence in the rigour of the original assessment.68 
 Such features are, in turn, reflected in the noticeably lower success rates for claimants at 
mandatory reconsideration compared with appeals (Figures 2 and 3). Of the 1.4 million 
reconsiderations decided between 2013-18, 20 per cent were allowed. By contrast, appeal success 
rates have been substantially higher: 40per cent rising to 65 per cent. What is striking here is that 
while mandatory reconsideration was introduced to reduce unnecessary appeals, the proportion of 
initial decisions overturned by tribunals has increased. 
 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3] 
 
Comparing review and tribunal outcomes is not necessarily comparing like with like because 
of the different cohorts of claimants. Furthermore, the wider issue as to why tribunals allow appeals 
is contested. The DWP has argued that appeals are often allowed because claimants submit new 
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May 2017. Claims for both Employment and Support Allowance and Personal Independence Payments are 
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evidence not previously considered.69 Accordingly, the rate of allowed appeals is not a perfect 
measure of the quality of initial decisions. Nonetheless, it is one such measure. Furthermore, the high 
and unprecedented rate of allowed appeals – 65 per cent – confirms that the mandatory 
reconsideration process is not being used to filter out appeals likely to be allowed by tribunals. On the 
contrary, the success rate indicates that significant improvements are required to the reconsideration 
process so that it can capture similar information as tribunals. At present, the mandatory 
reconsideration process results in a significant number of claimants not receiving benefits to which 
they are entitled if they do not pursue their cases to the tribunal. Further, the high proportion of 
allowed appeals erodes the trust of claimants and stakeholders in the system. As the Senior President 
of Tribunals has noted, the DWP frequently provides no justiciable defence against challenges to its 
decisions resulting in unnecessary appeals; the mandatory reconsideration process does nothing to 
improve the situation.70 
 A further area of concern relates to the wider public goods of litigation which may be obscured 
by the expansion of administrative review.71 One of the principal social purposes of administrative law 
litigation should be to identify ways of improving the quality of government decision-making more 
widely.72 Ideally, a redress system should have feedback-loops built in throughout to improve front-
line decisions.73 However, there is a mismatch between the Department’s ambitions and 
administrative reality. While the DWP aspires to a ‘right first time’ approach, it has struggled to raise 
the quality of decision-making. Staff undertaking mandatory reconsiderations are not routinely 
notified if their decisions are overturned by tribunals.74 Previous research has found that the most 
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effective influence of tribunals was through direct practical experience by individual officials in seeing 
how tribunals adjudicated upon cases.75 The department is increasing the previously low attendance 
by presenting officers, but the role of tribunals has overall been diminished. 
 Elsewhere in the benefits system, the problems have been more acute. The contracting-out 
of tax credit compliance checks to a private company, Concentrix, was marked by widespread failures 
in decision-making, such as official error and incorrect allegations of fraud. Vulnerable people lost 
benefits to which they were entitled, causing hardship. In this context, there was a 90 per cent success 
rate through mandatory reconsideration. This was accepted by both HM Revenue and Customs and 
Concentrix as a routine feature of the system, but there was no focus on improving initial decisions 
for those people who did not seek a mandatory reconsideration.76 
 Overall, the underlying idea of having a quick and informal reconsideration of social security 
decisions is unobjectionable, but has been highly problematic in practice. The Social Security Advisory 
Committee raised concerns that mandatory reconsideration is not working as it should and made 
detailed recommendations.77 In response, the DWP has sought to improve the gathering of evidence 
and the quality of decision-making.78 In 2018, the Work and Pensions Committee, noting the renewed 
focus on quality, recognised that mandatory reconsideration decision making had not always been 
characterised by thoroughness, consistency and an emphasis on quality and that not all claimants, 
perhaps wrongly, been turned down at this stage, will have had the strength and resources to appeal.79 
 
Immigration administrative reviews 
The Home Office decides some 3.5 million immigration applications per year to determine the 
immigration status of individuals against the requirements of the Immigration Rules and 
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supplementary policies. Immigration appeals were introduced in 1971 on the basis that it was 
‘fundamentally wrong and inconsistent with the rule of law that power to take decisions affecting a 
man’s whole future should be vested in officers of the executive, from whose findings there is no 
appeal.’80 Given the exceptionally sensitive nature of this jurisdiction and the risks of illegitimate 
executive pressure, great importance has been attached to the safeguards provided by tribunals: a full 
re-hearing of the evidence by an independent and judicial decision-maker; adversarial hearings; 
detailed reasoned decisions; and onward rights of appeal. However, as pressures on the system has 
grown with the increase in immigration, so have the volume of appeals and associated costs.81 The 
Home Office has long seen the appeals process as an impediment to its task of enforcing immigration 
controls. The deeply-embedded culture within the Home Office is that vexatious appeals are often 
lodged by people to postpone their removal from the UK and the more delay they can induce, then 
the better their chances of being ultimately able to stay. Yet, the appeals process has been successful 
in terms of providing individuals with an effective remedy. Some 40 per cent of immigration appeals 
were routinely allowed. Furthermore, the courts have increasingly intervened to enhance the role of 
appeals.82 
Acutely aware of the obstacle to limiting overall immigration presented by tribunals, the 
Home Office has then endeavoured to curtail appeals as part of its drive to create a ‘hostile 
environment’ for immigrants. In 2013, the then Home Secretary described the appeals process as ‘a 
never-ending game of snakes and ladders’ open to exploitation by foreign criminals, immigrants, and 
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their lawyers to delay the enforcement of immigration law.83 In 2014, all existing and long-standing 
immigration appeal rights (except on asylum and human rights grounds) were replaced with 
administrative review.84 This was estimated to save £261 million over 10 years.85 
 Given the toxic politics of immigration, replacing appeals with administrative review was 
widely viewed by immigration lawyers as another way of undermining fairness for applicants, 
reinforcing a deep-seated mutual distrust between them and the Home Office. Intense concerns were 
also raised in Parliament. It was argued that administrative review was not being introduced to secure 
fairness and justice for refused immigrants, but to reduce the number who would have succeeded had 
they been able to put their case to a tribunal.86 The Joint Committee on Human Rights invoked the 
well-known dictum of Hale LJ: ‘[i]n this day and age a right of access to a tribunal or other adjudicative 
mechanism established by the state is just as important and fundamental as a right of access to the 
ordinary courts.’87 Accordingly, withdrawing appeals would undermine the common law right of 
access to justice.88 The Home Office was implacable: only fundamental rights cases justified the 
expense and delay of an appeal. Immigration decisions did not fall within the right to a fair trial (Article 
6 ECHR).89 The Home Office did not recognise the notion of an overarching common law right of access 
to justice over and above primary legislation. The result is that only around 12 per cent of the 3.5 
million immigration decisions per year now attract a right of appeal. Nonetheless, the Home Office 
had admitted that the high appeal success rate was largely attributable to its own errors: 
approximately 60 per cent of appeals were allowed due to casework errors.90 As one MP noted, ‘the 
Government’s response to this high margin of error is not to seek to improve the quality of their 
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decision making, but rather to reduce the opportunities for challenge’.91 This made little difference to 
the political juggernaut. Indeed, the Home Office had the chutzpah to argue that the delays and costs 
of appeals were ‘not fair to applicants’.92 
 Previous administrative review processes in the immigration context have been widely 
criticised. Reviews had been characterised by boilerplate reasons, inconsistencies, and carelessness 
and were ineffective in identifying errors.93 In 2004, only one per cent of reviews succeeded for 
claimants compared with 40 per cent of appeals.94 According to the then Independent Monitor, the 
Home Office needed to improve the quality of reviews.95 Unsurprisingly, the Home Office 
subsequently gave its administrative review system a clean bill of health.96 Despite such concerns, 
reviews operated largely against the safety-net of appeals. By contrast, the 2014 changes marked a 
clean break with appeals and the withdrawal of this safeguard. Remaining appeals on human rights 
grounds will, in future, increasingly take place out of country.97 
To meet concerns over the abolition of appeals, ministers gave assurances.98 Administrative 
reviews would be undertaken by fully trained and experienced staff who would be independent of the 
original decision-maker and located in a separate operational unit. Feedback mechanisms would be 
established. The Home Office would also monitor the overturn rate on administrative review and 
investigate any discrepancy with the appeal success rate.99 In practice, none of these assurances were 
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kept. The Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration found that administrative reviews were being 
undertaken by low-level, untrained, and temporary staff with limited or no experience of immigration 
law, a notoriously complex area.100 Quality assurance was minimal and ineffectual. Valid applications 
had been incorrectly rejected and this had not been picked up. To ensure a degree of independence, 
in-country reviewers had been organised into a functionally separate unit from initial decision-makers, 
but the unit had been staffed with junior and inexperienced officials. Complex cases were not referred 
upwards to more senior caseworkers. By contrast, overseas reviewers worked alongside primary 
decision-makers; although there was no evidence of bias, it was more difficult to demonstrate that 
reviewers were truly independent. 
As regards the quality of review decisions, administrative reasons must be proper, adequate, 
intelligible, and deal with the substantial points raised.101 In practice, review decisions have been 
characterised by ‘an over-reliance on the initial refusal decision letter’ without addressing the 
applicant’s points of challenge.102 Perfunctory review notices that merely reiterate initial refusal 
reasons do not comprise an effective review.103 Another constraining factor is that fresh evidence will 
normally be disregarded irrespective of its importance.104 Success rates have been lower - far lower - 
than those of appeals. Some 49 per cent of appeals allowed under the former regime. The Home Office 
had concluded that 60 per cent of allowed appeals succeeded due to case-working errors. By contrast, 
in 2015-16, the success rate was eight per cent for in-country reviews and 22 per cent for at the border 
reviews.105 In 2016/17, the success rate was 3.4 per cent for in-country reviews and 6.8 per cent for 
border reviews.106 Assurances that such discrepancies would be investigated were unfulfilled - as were 
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promises of feedback loops to improve initial decision-making. The only assurance met was that 
reviews would be processed within 28 days. 
On top of this, the replacement of appeals with reviews reveals a wider flawed design. 
Without appeals, recourse to judicial review becomes more likely. However, for challenging 
individualised decisions, judicial review does not provide as effective a remedy as an appeal.107 
Tribunals undertake a full examination of the factual and legal basis of an individual’s case. Their 
decisions are final, subject to any onward challenge. The inability of the judicial review court to engage 
in fact-finding or to substitute decisions renders it an ‘entirely unsatisfactory’ mechanism for 
determining individual fact-sensitive issues.108 Judicial review only enables the court to quash a 
decision on relatively narrow grounds. It is also more costly, takes longer than appeals, and the Upper 
Tribunal currently has a high caseload.109 
The suspicions of immigration lawyers–that the Home Office cannot be trusted to mark its 
own homework–have effectively been confirmed by poor implementation. The Chief Inspector of 
Borders and Immigration has concluded that there was ‘there was significant room for improvement 
in respect of the effectiveness of administrative review in identifying and correcting case working 
errors, and in communicating decisions to applicants’.110 Even the normally defensive Home Office 
accepted that ‘quality has not consistently been of the standard to which we aspire’ and largely 
accepted the recommendations made.111 A subsequent investigation found some improvements by 
the Home Office.112 Yet, it also found that the Home Office had been unable to demonstrate that it 
had delivered an efficient, effective, and cost-saving replacement for the previous appeals 
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mechanisms.113 There continue to be serious weaknesses remaining in respect of reason-giving, the 
lack of a dedicated team for overseas reviews, and the variable level of quality assurance for overseas 
and border reviews. In its response to the report, the Home Office, noting that in-country reviews 
have improved, accepted that progress has been slower for reviews undertaken overseas and at the 
border. 
 
Does administrative review enhance or weaken administrative justice? 
The basic test of administrative justice is whether the qualities of a decision-making process provide 
arguments for the acceptability of its decisions.114 Acceptability implies trust and confidence.115 The 
above examination of different administrative review schemes presents a highly mixed picture. There 
are pockets of good practice. It is also apparent that some individual claimants may well feel that their 
particular cases were handled satisfactorily regardless of weaknesses in the wider administrative 
review system. Nonetheless, there are serious concerns concerning the operation of some 
administrative review schemes, in particular mandatory reconsideration and immigration reviews. In 
principle, administrative review could provide a swift and effective review of a decision, but in 
practice, the quality of review procedures and decision outcomes is highly variable. Success rates are 
substantially lower than those of tribunals. Mandatory reconsideration seems to deter many benefit 
claimants from pursuing their case to a tribunal. Immigration appeals have been largely abolished. 
There is little evidence that administrative review has raised the quality of initial decisions. Many of 
the legitimising qualities of tribunals–judicial procedures; independent, judicial and specialist 
decision-makers; and better reasoned decisions–have effectively been jettisoned for little in return. 
In light of such features, it is unlikely that many claimants would have confidence in administrative 
review as an adequate remedy.  It might be objected that this analysis is misplaced: administrative 
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review will inevitably be seen as inferior when compared with tribunals. But, given the relative 
importance of decisions, everyone ought to be able to expect a good decision to determine their 
entitlements. It is important not to allow the search for the best to defeat the good but, to be effective, 
redress procedures must achieve minimum standards. 
Even from a more sanguine view of the new administrative review, the practical effect of 
administrative review has still been to weaken the ability of people to secure effective redress. Process 
does not wholly determine outcome. Nevertheless, procedural restrictions are likely to have 
substantive effects thereby worsening the position for claimants.116 The risk is that fewer claimants 
now qualify because of the shift from tribunals to administrative review. Administrative review has 
also weakened public accountability of government. The transparency and openness of independent 
tribunal scrutiny has been significantly reduced. Indeed, it has been argued that the real attraction of 
administrative review is that it enables government to conceal from public view the full inadequacies 
of initial decision-making.117 Another wider consequence is that the proliferation of different 
administrative review schemes represents another likely source of confusion to the public in its 
understanding of the administrative justice system: the subtle though crucial dichotomy between 
appeals and complaints is not widely appreciated by the public and liable to confuse.118 Administrative 
review adds a further set of distinctions likely to exacerbate the problem. On the basis of the way the 
systems have been implemented, the recent expansion of administrative review is, in essence, a 
problematic response to the judicialisation of tribunals. 
Enhancing the quality of administrative review is then required. Indeed, the Law Commission 
is to undertake a law reform project on administrative review.119 We suggest that the following 
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reforms are worthy of consideration. First, to ensure their independence and to insulate them from 
political and administrative pressures, administrative review systems need to be separate and 
autonomous from initial decision-making institutions. Second, reviews should be undertaken by 
specialist and expert reviewers with experience of initial decision-making. Such reviewers need 
specialist training in the essential aspects of decision-making: fact-gathering and assessment; using 
inquisitorial procedures effectively; and reason-giving. At present, government departments have 
complete control of both initial and review decisions and procedures. In this respect, the refusal of 
both the DWP and the Home Office to allow continuous independent and external oversight of the 
operation of their review procedures is an unfortunate missed opportunity to promote public 
confidence.120 Third, government bodies need to take more responsibility for promoting the quality of 
both procedures and decision outcomes. At present, some claimants experience unnecessary difficulty 
in attaining their entitlements. This is self-defeating as it undermines the legitimacy of government. 
Government must ensure that the quality of procedures and decisions has equal priority as speed and 
cost. To this end, government needs to invest in developing adjudication as a decision-making 
technique and embed a culture of adjudication within the administrative review process in order to 
raise and maintain the quality of decision-making. Another option would be to make government 
departments themselves to pay the costs of allowed appeals. More generally, there needs to be 
commitment to the principle of systematic improvement to enhance the quality of both review 
processes and decisions. The flaw of current review processes is that it is possible to replicate the 
same quality as tribunals on the cheap. The fate of such proposals of course rests with government 
itself taking the initiative.121 
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Administrative review, judicial power and the separation of powers 
In this final part of the article, we consider the implications of the expansion of administrative review 
and the corresponding displacement of tribunals for the wider understanding of the public law system. 
In particular, we consider what insights this experience offers in respect of the debate on judicial 
power and the separation of powers within the UK constitution. 
 In recent years, public law scholars in the UK have observed how the power of judges to review 
government decisions has increased.122 There are many examples commonly offered in support of 
observations, such as the development of common law rights jurisprudence and the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The fear of some is that the courts are progressively trespassing beyond their 
appropriate constitutional and institutional boundaries, and becoming too involve in what are 
essentially ‘policy’ decisions that ought to be taken by other decision-makers.123 This broad concern 
has been given even greater prominence voice by the Judicial Power Project.124 The founders of the 
Project, and those who have expressed similar concerns, have regularly based their arguments up a 
reconstruction of JAG Griffith’s political constitution thesis, claiming that the UK’s traditional 
constitutional arrangement, which placed emphasis on political controls on power, are being 
supplanted by an emphasis on legal constitutionalism.125 The concern is that judicial power is usurping 
political and democratic power—breaching the separation of powers126 and creating a 
“juristocracy.”127 While there have been volumes written on the topic of judicial power in the past few 
years alone, the significant dismantling of judicial control of government effected through the 
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expansion of administrative review and the displacement of tribunals has been entirely absent from 
this debate. 
 The growth of administrative review is a clear demonstration of how judicial power has 
changed in multiple directions in recent years. While there has no doubt been an expansion of legal 
principle is some areas of public law, developments with administrative review shows how effective 
judicial control has also been removed and marginalised in other areas. This prompts questions about 
how power is understood in the debate around judicial power. The mainstream debate often takes 
power to mean the contours of legal doctrine as explained by judges, usually those judges sitting in 
appellate courts. This is an important metric. Yet, judicial power can also, and should also, be 
understood on the basis of what power is actually exercised over government. On this approach, the 
growth of administrative review is one of the most significant developments in judicial power in recent 
years. Far from being part of a rising “juristocracy,” the powers of some parts of the tribunal 
judiciary—those that have been effectively or legally displaced by administrative review—occupy a 
relatively precarious position within the UK’s constitutional framework. That is to say, they are a form 
of judicial control on administrative power that is insecure and subject to being significantly affected 
by the political and economic pressures that influence government policy. 
The rise of administrative review also provokes reflection on the nature of the separation of 
powers more generally. Increasingly, the principle is held out as significant within the UK 
constitution.128 In contrast to the idea of “checks and balances” under the separation of powers, 
recent changes to administrative review stand as a clear example of the ability of government to 
reshape fundamentally—in both design and effect—its own procedures and external dispute 
mechanisms, with little input or oversight from Parliament. Indeed, it underlines the huge amount of 
power inherent in positions occupied by government as designer, operator, and participant of the 
administrative justice system. From this perspective, the growth of administrative review in social 
                                                          
128 See e.g R. Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution: Judicial Competence and 
Independence in the United Kingdom (CUP, Cambridge 2010); N. Barber, ‘The Separation of Powers in the British 
Constitution’ (2012) Law: The Journal of the Higher School of Economics 3. 
31 
 
security and immigration represents a form of capture of the justice system by which government 
departments have extended their own dispute resolution systems at the expense of public justice 
systems.  
The performance of administrative review systems continues to receive insufficient attention 
from Parliament. The main external check on the performance of the administrative review systems 
have been reports by the Social Security Advisory Committee and the Independent Chief Inspector of 
Borders and Immigration, which recommended detailed reforms. Some, though far from all, of 
proposed reforms have been accepted. Such a state of affairs provides further support to Rubin’s 
thesis that, in the context of the modern administrative state, the account of government we derive 
from the classic separation of powers metaphor of “three branches” checking and balancing seems 
out of place and out of time.129 Instead, it reminds us that it is vital to move beyond conceptualisations 
of state based on a tripartite separation of powers mode and think more closely about the complex 
“networks” of accountability that give shape to the state and the justice system. 
Finally, despite much discussion concerning the growth of judicial power, the courts appear 
reluctant to intervene meaningfully in the operation of administrative review systems. The courts have 
recognised that administrative review is a markedly less favourable remedy than tribunal appeals.130 
The courts have also undertaken wide-ranging interventions in the operation of judicial procedures 
on the ground of systemic inherent unfairness.131 However, they appear reluctant to inquire into how 
an administrative process handles a mass caseload.132 Article 6 ECHR right to a fair trial offers no scope 
for intervention in the immigration context, but has some potential bite in the social security 
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context.133 The long-established curative principle, that access to judicial review—as opposed to an 
appeal—is sufficient to remedy administrative unfairness, has increasingly been doubted. The Upper 
Tribunal and the higher courts have emphasised the advantages of appeals over judicial review when 
expanding immigration appeals and, in the social security context, to prevent the mandatory 
reconsideration time limit from reducing access to tribunals.134 There are also indications that a 
putative common law jurisprudence on access to justice could provide a basis for judicial intervention, 
though this is only ever likely to shave off some particularly sharp edges.135 
Overall, the recent experience with administrative review exposes a very different side to 
recent debates about judicial power and the separation of powers within the UK constitution. Instead 
of the expanded powers wielded by a juristocracy, this is evidence of significant curtailing of judicial 
control of government. Instead of effective Parliamentary oversight and control of administrative 
power, we see administration redesigning and controlling its own redress system while being subject 
to minimal scrutiny from the legislature. Finally, we see that the courts have only limited power to 
influence the operation of administrative review system which, on examination, can have adverse 
consequences for administrative justice. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has considered the recent rapid growth of administrative review through detailed studies 
of social security and immigration review processes. This experience reflects a wider and inherent 
predicament of contemporary justice systems. All justice processes face a fundamental trade-off 
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between the need for fairness and efficiency.136 People want an authentic and credible means for 
resolving their disputes which are of high-quality, effective, timely, and use fair procedures. In 
practice, formal legal procedures tend to be costly. Increases in cases produce backlogs and delays, 
and ultimately often frustrate the immediate political ends governments is striving for. In response, 
the government has been seeking to formulate policy responses to cost and delay. One response has 
been to attempt reduce demand on formal legal procedures. Other responses include streamlining 
formal legal procedures or diverting disputes into ancillary alternative processes. The basic problem 
is that such alternative processes typically, though not necessarily, lack the authenticity and 
effectiveness of formal legal procedures and tend to weaken public confidence.  
 In principle, administrative review could be an advantageous way of seeking to resolve 
disputes quickly, at lower cost, and with less anxiety for individuals than appearing before tribunals. 
However, drawing upon a range of empirical evidence, we have demonstrated that the operation of 
administrative review in practice—at least in the contexts we have discussed—is characterised by 
multiple problems. It has found that the expansion of administrative review tends to reduce both 
access to justice and the quality of decision-making. Overall, there is a lack of independence and 
impartiality in how reviews are undertaken. There is variation in the way evidence is handled and in 
how review decisions are made. Administrative review success rates of administrative review are far 
lower than those of tribunals. There is a considerable difference between a review as a quick check as 
to whether the initial decision was wrong compared with a full de novo judicial fact-finding 
assessment. The insertion of administrative review has either withdrawn access to tribunals or made 
such access more difficult—displacing tribunals and curtailing judicial control of government. These 
shortcomings severely limit the effectiveness of administrative review. The overall outcome is a 
negative one for individuals in terms seeking access to justice to obtain their legal entitlements. At 
                                                          




least in its present form, the development of administrative review represents a significant 
deterioration in the quality of administrative justice system.  
 Placed within the wider context of the UK’s constitutional arrangements, the tale of 
administrative review told here offer a contrasting narrative to that at the centre of recent debates 
on judicial power and the separation of powers. This is a tale of de-judicialisation at a time when the 
dominant focus is on the expansion of judicial power that is placed in the hands of an elite class of 
judge. The growth of administrative review and the corresponding displacement of tribunals is 
highlight how some parts of the judiciary occupy a positon that is liable to being heavily affected by 
economic and policy changes. 
 A final, forward-looking word is needed on the digital transformation programme being 
implemented by the Ministry of Justice and the status of administrative review in light of those 
reforms.137 The board intention is to transform tribunals by making them digital by default, in order 
to improve both efficiency and access to justice. In the social security context, physical tribunal 
hearings are to be largely, though not fully, replaced by continuous online hearings in which appellants 
interact with the tribunal through an online messaging service. Appeals handled online would be 
resolved much more quickly than the current average of 20 weeks. In the immigration context, greater 
use will be made of video link hearings. With the advent of online tribunal procedures, the distinction 
between administrative review and tribunal procedures may again be reconsidered: it makes little 
sense to operate paper-based administrative review procedures while simultaneously introducing 
online tribunal hearings. There are many questions and concerns about these reforms138 and 
reintroducing appeals via a new online approach would likely increase the caseload of tribunals, but 
doing so would also likely enable swifter and better quality decisions than that currently provided by 
administrative review. Such a step would follow a logic that pursues the enhancement of 
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administrative justice. However, as highlighted above, the digitalisation of tribunals is the Ministry of 
Justice’s response to the economic and political circumstances in which its finds itself, while 
administrative review was the response of other departments—namely, the Home Office and DWP. It 
would be naïve to suggest the Ministry of Justice ongoing reform project will be the breakthrough 
moment where a joined-up approach to administrative justice system-design is deployed, when that 
has not been the case so far. Nevertheless, it does indicate that there is a need to reform the 
effectiveness of justice processes and this should be focused exclusively on tribunals and courts. Given 
the increasing prominence of administrative review as either a substitute to or a mandatory stage 
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Figure 2: Mandatory reconsiderations, 2013-18





Note: this Figure shows the proportion of social security appeals allowed by the First-tier Tribunal (Social 
Entitlement) Chamber and the proportion of mandatory reconsiderations allowed in favour of claimants. 
Sources: DWP, Employment and Support Allowance: Work Capability Assessments, Mandatory 
Reconsiderations and Appeals (2018); DWP, Personal Independence Payments: Official Statistics (2018); 
















Figure 3: Mandatory reconsideration and tribunal success rates, 2013-18
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